paine's america post-lexington and concord
And now, the blog post you’ve been waiting for, the latest and greatest thing you’ve read this moment—Continuing through Common Sense by embarking on “Thoughts of the Present State of American Affairs.”
Those of you who have been following, know that I’ve been working through a summary of and response to the main ideas in Paine’s most mentioned work. Having complete the first two sections, it’s now time to examine Paine’s examination of the contemporary state of American political affairs. He has spent the previous segment analyzing the reasons why the very institution of monarchy is flawed and, in his view, against the very will and desires of God. The next logical step in his analysis is to examine the effects the British monarchy has had on the American colonies.
Paine begins this section by once again admonishing his readers to put off preconceived prejudices and allow their reason to inform their opinions. Too late, he states, are attempts to continue the debate—the king of England has pushed the contest between England and America into to the realm of armed combat and America must answer accordingly. America must answer this challenge because it is “not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom, but of a continent;” She must answer because it is “not the concern of a day, a year, or an age”—it is a concern of all posterity. Decisions made now affect every inhabitant of the future of this continent. This, for Paine, is a turning point that must be noted. There has been a shift in the dealings between England and America that cannot be reversed. “All plans, proposals, &c. prior to the nineteenth of April, i.e. to the commencement of hostilities, are like the almanac of the last your; which, though proper then are superseded and useless now.” Here again, Paine shows his talent for meeting his readers where they are: he has noted the necessity of a new approach without alienating those who had advocated plans of reconciliation and discourse prior to Lexington and Concord. Paine recognizes the “advantages of reconciliation,” but states that time has passed away “like an agreeable dream.” Ideas of reconciliation were good while they lasted, but King George has erased that possibility. A new approach must be taken, and that approach is to answer arms with arms—to separate from England.
Paine next addresses a logical argument against separation: that as America has seen success under the crown of England, she must remain there in order to continue with such success. Not only does Paine reject this argument (“We may as well assert that because a child has thrived upon milk that it is never to have meat…”), he asserts “that America would have flourished as much, and probably much more, had no European power had any thing to do with her.” He seems here to assume that some form of non-colonial trade would easily be established. Paine seems to feel this particular argument is hardly worth a response, for he gives little space to addressing it. He clearly seems to feel that any argument for avoiding separation on the basis of either past or hypothetical future success gained due to security under crown of England is not a compelling argument; that America would have done and would continue to do just fine on its own, and his readers should be able to see that. (1)
When faced with the argument of England’s protection, Paine summarily dismisses it as well. He begins by stating that England’s protection was not altruistic or maternal solely, but that the crown “...defended the continent at our expense as well as her own...” (2) He continues by explaining “...that she did not protect us from OUR ENEMIES on OUR ACCOUNT, but from HER ENEMIES on HER OWN ACCOUNT,...” (3) Paine clearly wishes his readers to begin viewing England’s actions from a more suspicious standpoint, and thus focuses on pointing out the self-preservation aspect of England’s protection. Not only does he state unequivocally that England protects the colonies solely out of self-interest, he makes the application that were America to “Let Britain wave her pretensions to the continent, or the continent throw off the dependence, and we should be at peace with France and Spain were they at war with Britain.” This is, of course, a direct application of Paine’s earlier contention that wars are the result of the pride of kings and nothing else. This would seem to entirely overlook the histories of Ancient Greece and Rome during their respective periods of democracy and republicanism.
Throughout this section, Paine seems to take for granted that his blunt and summary responses will be accepted as sense. He takes almost no time to elaborate any point, assuming that his bare sentiments are enough to prove his point. He will take more time to deal with the argument that Britain is America’s parent, perhaps seeing it as an argument worthy of more attention. Nevertheless, his responses to these two arguments against separation (“The crown has brought America success” and “England has protected us at her expense”) leave a bit to be desired. Paine treats them as though he feels they aren’t actually credible arguments. That seems shallow and short-sighted considering what was at stake at the time of his writing. If nothing else, the length and breadth of his arguments enable us now to see what he felt were the most compelling arguments brought by his contemporaries. And as he has so perceptively addressed his audience in other areas, it is perhaps enough that he addressed these arguments at all. As for us, we shall move on to his next answer—that addressed to the argument of England as the parent and America as the progeny—next time.
(1) In fact, I fear Paine is suffering from a bit of patriotic hyperbole here. Looking at the 17th and 18th centuries for what they were, it is unlikely that any new colonial growth could have survived long without colonial backing of some form. Just the overspill from European wars would have made the success of a purely independent colonial venture on the level with American success highly improbable. The mere act of signing a trade agreement with one European power would have created a conflict with all the others that a young colony could ill afford to handle.
(2) Paine seems to be ignoring the fact that the American colonies asked for defense, particularly during the French and Indian War. He certainly makes light of the deeper-than-mere-trade connection working in obvious favor for the colonies. Yes, the defense of the colonies cost the colonies as well as the crown, but it bestowed great benefit on the colonies in return.
(3) This could be true were we splitting hairs, but the question could be raised: is there an actual difference between the two when the colonies are part of the crown? Is not protection from the enemies of England the same as protection from enemies of the colonies? Had he wanted to make a difference between European enemies and tribes hostile to the colonials, he should perhaps have been more specific. Yet even there, the enemy is one of both due to disruptions of trades and taxes over the sea should the colonies face hostility from the native tribes around them. He appears to make distinctions where they don’t easily exist.
(4) Given the nature of war and colonies at the time, Paine’s scenario is unlikely. It is far more likely that had England dissolved her bonds with the colonies, the colonies would merely have been conquered by another power (likely France). He seems to be ignoring the history of contemporary colonialism in favor of his personal view of the motivations of warfare.